FOI Advisory Council Opinion AO-08-24

AO-08-24

November 18, 2024

Melissa Waugh
Fairfax, Virginia
Request received via email

The staff of the Freedom of Information Advisory Council is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your email of November 19, 2023.

Dear Ms. Waugh:

You have requested an advisory opinion relative to the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et seq. of the Code of Virginia) (FOIA) on the following questions:

1. Is there a prohibition in FOIA against a public body accepting a public records request from an attorney on behalf of a client?
2. Is there a prohibition in FOIA against a public body disclosing public records to an attorney acting on behalf of a client?
3. Must a public body accept a FOIA request for public records from an attorney on behalf of a client?
4. Must a public body disclose public records to an attorney acting on behalf of a client pursuant to a lawful FOIA request for records?
5. In the previous questions, would it make a difference if the FOIA request for public records was made by, and the records were to be disclosed to, an authorized employee of the attorney's law firm (e.g., a legal assistant or paralegal)?

Factual Background

As background information, you are a special education attorney in Virginia representing families of children with disabilities in disputes with school districts. In your letter requesting an advisory opinion, you stated that, since FOIA was amended in 2021 to prohibit a public body from charging for scholastic records requested by a student or a minor student's parent, you have started requesting student scholastic records through FOIA rather than through the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. In addition, you stated that you use FOIA instead of FERPA to request scholastic records because under FOIA parents can get the records sent to them electronically instead of being required to go to the school to scan their child's records. Furthermore, you stated that the deadline for responding to FOIA requests is shorter than such deadline under FERPA.

In your letter requesting an advisory opinion, you stated that "despite providing a school district's FOIA Officer with a signed release from the parent to disclose the student's records to our law firm, the district has claimed they can only accept requests from, and release records to, the parent and not the parent's attorney." You stated that you consider this provision to be unnecessary as it has been firmly established in Virginia law that "an attorney is the agent of his/her client and may act on his/her behalf."1

In your letter, you also contend that even though FOIA does not include a definition for the term "agent," "[r]ules of statutory construction dictate that in the absence of a statutory definition, the term is considered to have its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used."2 You cited in your letter a previously issued advisory opinion of the Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Council (the FOIA Council) that recognized that ". . . a 'principal-agent' relationship is well defined by the Supreme Court of Virginia . . . the use of the word 'agent' in the FOIA context should be given the same meaning as at common law."3 You also referenced another advisory opinion from the FOIA Council that opined, "FOIA does not define the term 'agent,' so in order to determine if an entity is acting as an agent of a public body, the Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Council has previously opined that one must examine the elements of the common law 'principal-agent' relationship."4

Analysis

FOIA policy, as stated in relative part in subsection B of § 2.2-3700 of the Code of Virginia, provides that:

By enacting this chapter, the General Assembly ensures the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records in the custody of a public body or its officers and employees, and free entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the business of the people is being conducted. The affairs of government are not intended to be conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy since at all times the public is to be the beneficiary of any action taken at any level of government. Unless a public body or its officers or employees specifically elect to exercise an exemption provided by this chapter or any other statute, every meeting shall be open to the public and all public records shall be available for inspection and copying upon request. All public records and meetings shall be presumed open, unless an exemption is properly invoked.

The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to promote an increased awareness by all persons of governmental activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations of government. Any exemption from public access to records or meetings shall be narrowly construed and no record shall be withheld or meeting closed to the public unless specifically made exempt pursuant to this chapter or other specific provision of law. This chapter shall not be construed to discourage the free discussion by government officials or employees of public matters with the citizens of the Commonwealth

All public bodies and their officers and employees shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with a requester concerning the production of the requested records.

Additionally, subsection A of § 2.2-3704 of the Code of Virginia, in relevant part, provides that:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all public records shall be open to citizens of the Commonwealth, representatives of newspapers and magazines with circulation in the Commonwealth, and representatives of radio and television stations broadcasting in or into the Commonwealth during the regular office hours of the custodian of such records. Access to such records shall be provided by the custodian in accordance with this chapter by inspection or by providing copies of the requested records, at the option of the requester.

Hence, the essential doctrine of FOIA as described in its policy is the inclination toward all public records being presumed open for inspection or copying, unless an exemption is properly invoked.5 Additionally, another fundamental principle of FOIA is that "[a]ll public bodies and their officers and employees shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with citizens and designated media representatives concerning the production of the public records requested."6

Section 2.2-3701 of the Code of Virginia defines "public records" as:

all writings and recordings that consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostatting, photography, magnetic impulse, optical or magneto-optical form, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation, however stored, and regardless of physical form or characteristics, prepared or owned by, or in the possession of a public body or its officers, employees, or agents in the transaction of public business.

Section 2.2-3701 of the Code of Virginia provides, in relative part, that a "public body" means:

any legislative body, authority, board, bureau, commission, district, or agency of the Commonwealth or of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, including counties, cities, and towns, municipal councils, governing bodies of counties, school boards, and planning commissions; governing boards of public institutions of higher education; and other organizations, corporations, or agencies in the Commonwealth supported wholly or principally by public funds. It shall include (i) the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program and its board of directors established pursuant to Chapter 50 (§ 38.2-5000 et seq.) of Title 38.2 and (ii) any committee, subcommittee, or other entity however designated of the public body created to perform delegated functions of the public body or to advise the public body. It shall not exclude any such committee, subcommittee, or entity because it has private sector or citizen members. (emphasis added)

Section 2.2-3701 of the Code of Virginia also defines "scholastic records" as "those records containing information directly related to a student or an applicant for admission and maintained by a public body that is an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." For the purposes of FOIA, a school board is a public body due to its inclusion in the list of entities explicitly designated in the definition of a public body in § 2.2-3701 of the Code of Virginia, and scholastic records are public records applicable to a specific student or student-applicant as defined.

Another guideline of FOIA to be considered in our analysis is the "the narrow construction rule of FOIA," which provides that exemptions shall be interpreted as narrowly construed.7 The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized in Gloss v Wheeler this specific statutory provision of FOIA that "'puts the interpretative thumb on the scale in favor of' open government."8 This office has previously opined that "exemptions [to FOIA] must be 'narrowly construed' in favor of disclosure."9 Additionally, "if a statute does not specifically exempt a record from disclosure, it must be made available for public inspection and copying under FOIA."10 Thus, FOIA contains an inherent preference for the release of public records as opposed to nondisclosure.

In this matter, the applicable exclusion to FOIA for scholastic records may be found in subdivision A 1 of § 2.2-3705.4 of the Code of Virginia, which provides an exemption from mandatory disclosure for the following records:

1. Scholastic records containing information concerning identifiable individuals, except that such access shall not be denied to the person who is the subject thereof, or the parent or legal guardian of the student. However, no student shall have access to (i) financial records of a parent or guardian or (ii) records of instructional, supervisory, and administrative personnel and educational personnel ancillary thereto, that are in the sole possession of the maker thereof and that are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a substitute.

The parent or legal guardian of a student may prohibit, by written request, the release of any individual information regarding that student until the student reaches the age of 18 years. For scholastic records of students under the age of 18 years, the right of access may be asserted only by his legal guardian or parent, including a noncustodial parent, unless such parent's parental rights have been terminated or a court of competent jurisdiction has restricted or denied such access. For scholastic records of students who are emancipated or attending a public institution of higher education in the Commonwealth, the right of access may be asserted by the student.

Any person who is the subject of any scholastic record and who is 18 years of age or older may waive, in writing, the protections afforded by this subdivision. If the protections are so waived, such records shall be disclosed.

Thus, scholastic records are excluded from mandatory disclosure to the general public by a public body except as provided in subsection B of § 2.2-3705.4 of the Code of Virginia or where such disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law, and redaction of excluded information from a public record shall be conducted in accordance with § 2.2-3704.01 of the Code of Virginia.

Subsection B of § 2.2-3705.4 of the Code of Virginia is a further prohibition on the release of certain information from scholastic records unless written permission is given. Specifically, that subsection provides that:

The custodian of a scholastic record shall not release the address, phone number, or email address of a student in response to a request made under this chapter without written consent. For any student who is (i) 18 years of age or older, (ii) under the age of 18 and emancipated, or (iii) attending an institution of higher education, written consent of the student shall be required. For any other student, written consent of the parent or legal guardian of such student shall be required.

Hence, a student's scholastic records are not subject to mandatory release, except that the records must be provided to the student or the student's parent or legal guardian. FOIA also provides that "[t]he parent or legal guardian of a student may prohibit, by written request, the release of any individual information regarding that student until the student reaches the age of 18 years." For students younger than the age of 18, FOIA provides that "the right of access to scholastic records may be asserted only by his legal guardian or parent, including a noncustodial parent, unless such parent's parental rights have been terminated or a court of competent jurisdiction has restricted or denied such access." For scholastic records of students who are 18 years of age or older, emancipated, or attending a public institution of higher education in the Commonwealth, "the right of access may be asserted by the student." Lastly, "[a]ny person who is the subject of any scholastic record and who is 18 years of age or older may waive, in writing, the protections afforded by this subdivision" and "[i]f the protections are so waived, such records shall be disclosed."

As you noted in your request for an advisory opinion, this office has previously examined the principal-agent relationship in several prior opinions.11 Those previous assessments usually addressed the FOIA requirements for a public body and its agent-contractor, not those for a requester and his attorney.12 As previously acknowledged, there is no definition for "agent" in FOIA.13 So, following the guidance of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Lawlor v. Commonwealth, "an undefined term must be given its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used."14 "Furthermore, the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction, and a statute should never be construed in a way that leads to absurd results."15 As opined in prior opinions, when encountering an undefined term in FOIA, the "rules of construction dictate that when a term not defined, it is considered to have its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used is not specifically defined in Virginia law."16 "Therefore, the use of the word 'agent' in the FOIA context should be given the same meaning as at common law."17

This office has previously opined that proper analysis requires understanding the elements of the common law principal-agent relationship that have been "well defined by the Supreme Court of Virginia."18 The Supreme Court of Virginia defined "agency" as "a fiduciary relationship resulting from one person's manifestation of consent to another person that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and the other person's manifestation of consent so to act."19 The Supreme Court of Virginia, recognizing control as the determining factor in ascertaining whether an agency relationship exists, articulated that "it is necessary that an agent not only be subject to the principal's control, with regard to not only the results but also to the methods and details of doing the work."20 "In addition, the work must be done by the agent for the principal's benefit."21 "The law does not presume that an agency relationship exists; instead, the presumption is that a person is acting for himself, and not as another's agent."22 Furthermore, "the party alleging an agency relationship bears the burden of proving it" and "whether an agency relationship exists is largely a question of fact."23

In a principal-agent relationship, the principal is generally liable for the actions of the agent. Similar to the principal-agent relationship is the attorney-client relationship. The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that "an attorney's liability generally is to his client if the attorney has been guilty of some dereliction of duty to the client."24 Although acknowledging that attorneys owe a general duty to the judicial system, the Supreme Court of Virginia declared that "the attorney's primary and paramount duty is to the client."25 In particular, an attorney "may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation."26 Therefore, an attorney acting on behalf of a client is not only guided by Virginia law on the principal-agent relationship but also by the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia in the performance of the attorney's duties.

Furthermore, it is a fact-specific determination as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed in any particular situation. 27 As the Rules of Professional Conduct do not specifically contain a definition for "attorney-client relationship," the Virginia State Bar's Standing Committee on Legal Ethics has consistently relied upon the definition found in the Unauthorized Practice Rules:

Generally, the relation of attorney and client exits [sic], and one is deemed to be practicing law whenever he furnishes to another advice or service under circumstances which imply his possession and use of legal knowledge.28

"That definition looks to the nature of the work performed more than to some formalistic requirement of an express agreement by the client to retain the lawyer as his attorney."29

The Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia only govern conduct of licensed attorneys and not the conduct of nonlawyers. "Regulation of nonlawyers is governed by the Virginia State Bar and the Unauthorized Practice Rules" and "[i]ssuing opinions interpreting the Unauthorized Practice Rules is the task of the Virginia State Bar's Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law."30 However, the Rules of Professional Conduct address an attorney's or law firm's responsibility for a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with an attorney or a firm.31

Attorneys "have a duty to be competent in the representation of their clients and to ensure that those who are working under their supervision perform competently."32 An attorney must consider that a nonlawyer working under the attorney's supervision "understands and will comply with the ethical rules that govern" the attorney's conduct and "will act in a manner that is compatible with" the attorney's professional obligations.33 To comply with Rule 5.3(b) of the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, the attorney "must be able to adequately supervise" the nonlawyer, but, more specifically, the attorney "needs to review the nonlawyer's work on an ongoing basis to ensure its quality."34 The attorney "must maintain ongoing communication to ensure that the nonlawyer is discharging the assignment in accordance with the [attorney's] directions and expectations," and the attorney "needs to review thoroughly all work product to ensure its accuracy and reliability and that it is in the client's interest."35 The attorney is "ultimately responsible for the conduct and work product of the nonlawyer."36

Your final question inquired as to whether it would make a difference if a FOIA request for public records was submitted by or the records were disclosed to an authorized employee of the attorney's law firm such as a legal assistant or paralegal. In general, a nonlawyer, for example a legal assistant or paralegal, may act under the supervision of an attorney in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Standing Committee on Legal Ethics of the Virginia State Bar has previously issued an opinion considering the appropriateness of a paralegal contacting a government agency through FOIA on a matter in the midst of litigation or an administrative proceeding. "The committee [on Legal Ethics] is of the opinion that the role of the governmental agency in accommodating the need of the public at large or the opposing party in particular for information in the possession of the agency has been addressed by [FOIA]."37 The Standing Committee on Legal Ethics determined that "it is thus not improper for opposing counsel or his paralegal to avail themselves of information available under [FOIA]."38 Furthermore, the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics believed "that where contact with a governmental agency is authorized through statutory provisions, such as the Freedom of Information Act, communication carried out by an employee of an attorney opposing the agency in litigation is neither improper nor violative of DR 7-103(A)(1)."39 Therefore, a paralegal or other nonlawyer operating under the authority of a supervising attorney may take such lawful action on behalf of the client as assigned or directed by the supervising attorney to perform.

Lastly, FOIA specifically addresses the issue of a person utilizing legal representation to submit requests for public records on his behalf in subsection A of § 2.2-3713 of the Code of Virginia. Subsection A in relevant part provides that a petition for mandamus or injunction "may be brought in the name of the person notwithstanding that a request for public records was made by the person's attorney in his representative capacity." This provision explicitly contemplates that a records request may be made by an attorney on behalf of a client represented by the attorney. This provision of FOIA was added in 2010 to clarify that a FOIA enforcement action through the filing of a petition for mandamus or injunction may be brought in the name of a person notwithstanding that a request for public records was made by the person's attorney in his representative capacity.40 Furthermore, the bill also added the provision that costs and reasonable fees for expert witnesses may be recovered by the petitioner in a FOIA action.41

Questions

You submitted the following five questions regarding the principal-agent relationship, and more specifically the attorney-client relationship, as it pertains to FOIA and the production of requested records.

Question 1: Is there a prohibition in FOIA against a public body accepting a public records request from an attorney on behalf of a client?

There are no specific provisions in FOIA that prohibit a public body from accepting a request for public records from an attorney on behalf of a client. In regards to this issue, subsection A of § 2.2-3713 of the Code of Virginia references a request being made by a person's attorney as a prelude to filing an enforcement action. Under Virginia law as previously referenced, an attorney may be recognized as an agent or representative of a client. When a parent or legal guardian of a student or a student 18 years of age or older has retained an attorney to represent his interests, then the attorney is recognized under Virginia law as acting on behalf of the client. In so representing the client, the attorney must act in the best interests of the client within the ethical confines of the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys.

Question 2: Is there a prohibition in FOIA against a public body disclosing public records to an attorney acting on behalf of a client?

There is no specific provision in FOIA that prohibits a public body from disclosing records to an attorney acting on behalf of a client. FOIA is silent on the issue. Again, Virginia law provides that an attorney may be recognized as an agent or representative of a client when disclosing such representation to a third party. A recommended practice may include a public body requesting that an attorney disclose or acknowledge representation of a parent or legal guardian of a student or a student 18 years of age or older with a sworn or written statement from the attorney or the client.

Question 3: Must a public body accept a FOIA request for public records from an attorney on behalf of a client?

FOIA also does not contain any provision requiring a public body to accept a FOIA request for public records from an attorney on behalf of a client. However, as previously stated, subsection A of § 2.2-3713 of the Code of Virginia references a request being made by a person's attorney as a prelude to filing an enforcement action. In addition, Virginia law provides that an agent may act on behalf of the principal. FOIA policy as provided in subsection B of § 2.2-3700 of the Code of Virginia states that the General Assembly enacted FOIA to ensure "the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records." FOIA policy in this subsection further provides that "[a]ll public bodies and their officers and employees shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with a requester concerning the production of the records requested." Thus, if an attorney acknowledges to a public body that the attorney is representing and acting on behalf of a parent or legal guardian or a student 18 years of age or older, then the public body may require some verification of the representation. However, once representation is verified, then the public body should accept such relationship as lawful and respond accordingly.

Question 4: Must a public body disclose public records to an attorney acting on behalf of a client pursuant to a lawful FOIA request for records?

FOIA contains no provision specifically requiring a public body to disclose public records to an attorney acting on behalf of a client. Nevertheless, as previously stated, Virginia law provides that an agent may act on behalf of a principal. FOIA policy, as well as subsection C of § 2.2-3704 of the Code of Virginia, specifically provides that a "public body shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with the requester concerning the production of the records requested." Subsection G of § 2.2-3704 of the Code of Virginia also provides that a "public body shall make reasonable efforts to provide records in any format under such terms and conditions as agreed between the requester and public body, including the payment of reasonable costs." Therefore, once the attorney-client relationship is verified by a public body, then the public body should respond accordingly.

Question 5: In the previous questions, would it make a difference if the FOIA request for public records was made by, and the records were to be disclosed to, an authorized employee of the attorney's law firm (e.g., a legal assistant or paralegal)?

FOIA does not contain a specific provision relating to an attorney's or firm's employee acting on behalf of a client. However, as previously referenced, Virginia law recognizes the legitimacy of legal representation and the principal-agent relationship. A nonlawyer employee may operate under the supervision of an attorney or law firm in accordance with the standards of the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Therefore, after verifying legal representation, a public body should accept requests for records submitted by an authorized employee of a recognized attorney or firm on behalf of a parent, legal guardian, or student 18 years of age or older.

Conclusion

Applying the well-established legal relationships of principal-agent and attorney-client to FOIA matters is not unique. There is one provision in FOIA that specifically contemplates an agent acting on behalf of a principal. Subsection B of § 2.2-3713 of the Code of Virginia provides that "[i]n any action brought before a general district court, a corporate petitioner may appear through its officer, director or managing agent without the assistance of counsel, notwithstanding any provision of law or Rule of Supreme Court of Virginia to the contrary." FOIA recognizes and anticipates "principal-agent" representation under such a circumstance, and, therefore, it should not be considered radical for a public body to accept an agent acting on behalf of an individual in regards to other aspects of the FOIA process.

FOIA policy as provided in subsection B of § 2.2-3700 of the Code of Virginia states that the General Assembly enacted FOIA to ensure "the people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records." FOIA policy in this subsection further provides that "[a]ll public bodies and their officers and employees shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with a requester concerning the production of the records requested." Subsection C of § 2.2-3704 of the Code of Virginia also provides that a "public body shall make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with the requester concerning the production of the records requested." Finally, subsection G of § 2.2-3704 of the Code of Virginia provides further that a "public body shall make reasonable efforts to provide records in any format under such terms and conditions as agreed between the requester and public body, including the payment of reasonable costs." FOIA is not intended to be "an adversarial process staking government against citizens."42 A public body possesses a duty to work with a requester and the requester's agent or attorney, if so designated, and should avoid actions intending to frustrate FOIA's policy of timely access to records relating to the transaction of public business.

Thank you for contacting this office. We hope that this opinion is of assistance.

Sincerely,

Joseph Underwood
Senior Attorney

Alan Gernhardt
Executive Director

1Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bowers, 25 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1943) (noting that "an attorney is the agent of his client, and has authority to take all lawful steps for the protection of his client's interest. . . ."); see also Newman v. Newman, 593 S.E.2d 533, 538-39 (2004) ("Under the common law of agency, the signature of a disclosed, authorized agent has the same legal force as the signature of his principal. . . . [c]ommon law agency principles apply to the attorney-client relationship. . . [t]he statutory requirement that the parties sign the agreement does not, either linguistically or legally, exclude them from doing so through their attorneys."); In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 205 B.R. 767, n.7 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1997) ("The attorney-client relationship encompasses an agent-principal relationship. An attorney is the agent of his client and has the authority to take all lawful steps for the protection of his client's interests."); Murphy v. Allora, 977 F.Supp. 748, 751 (E.D. Va. 1997) (". . . an attorney, as the agent of his client, has the authority to take all necessary actions to protect the interests of his client."); Van Gundy v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 8 Va. Cir. 497 (VA Law and Chancery Ct., 1970).
2Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 14 (2003) (citing Commonwealth of Va., Dept. of Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980)).
3Id.
4Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 19 (2003) and 14 (2003).
5See Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3700(B).
6Id.
7See Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 02 (2023), 02 (2021), 04 (2020), 01 (2020), 04 (2019), 03 (2015), 06 (2013) and 01 (2013).
8Gloss v. Wheeler, 301 Va. 258, 279, 887 S.E.2d 11 (2023) (citing Fitzgerald v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 289 Va. 499, 505, 771 S.E.2d 858 (2015)).
9Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 02 (2021) (citing Virginia Dept. of Corrections v. Surovell, 290 Va. 255, 263, 776 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 289 Va. 499, 505, 771 S.E.2d 858, 860-61 (2015)).
10Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 04 (2019) (quoting Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 07 (2003)).
11See Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 19 (2003) and 14 (2003).
12See Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 14 (2003).
13See Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 19 (2003) and 14 (2003).
14Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 237, 738 S.E.2d 847, 875 (Va. 2013) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
15Id.
16Commonwealth Department of Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Service, 220 VA 655, 261 S.E. 2d 532 (1980), 1991 Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 140, 1988 Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 413, 1986-1987 Op. Atty. Gen. Va. 174; see generally Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, 6th ed., §46:01; see Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 01 (2022), 19 (2003), and 14 (2003).
17Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 14 (2003).
18See Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 19 (2003) and 14 (2003).
19Freedom of Information Advisory Opinions 19 (2003) and 14 (2003) (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 247 Va. 199, 203, 441 S.E. 2d 16, 19 (Va. 1994), Reistroffer v. Person, 247 Va. 45, 439 S.E. 2d 376 (Va. 1994), Allen v. Lindstrom, 237 Va. 489, 496, 379 S.E.2d 450, 454 (Va. 1989), Drake v. Livesay, 231 Va. 117, 341 S.E. 2d 186 (Va. 1986), Texas Co. v. Zeigler, 177 Va. 557, 564, 14 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Va. 1941), Wells v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 616, 151 S.E. 2d 422 (Va. 1966), Whitfield v. Whittaker Memorial Hospital, 237 Va. 489, 169 S.E. 2d 450 (Va. 1969).
20Id.
21Id.
22Id.
23Id.
24Allen at 499, at 456.
25Id.
26Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, § II, 1.2(d).
27LE Op. 1820 (January 27, 2006).
28Id.
29Id.
30Id.; See Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, § II, 5.5.
31See Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, § II, 5.1 and 5.3.
32LE Op. 1850 (December 28, 2010); See Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, § II, 1.1.
33Id.
34Id.; See Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia, Part 6, § II, 5.3(b).
35Id.
36Id.
37LE Op. 1504 (December 14, 1992).
38Id.
39Id.; See DR 7-103(A)(1): "During the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so."
40Chapter 299 of the Acts of Assembly of 2010.
41Id.
42Freedom of Information Advisory Opinion 16 (2004).