Attorney General's Opinion 1984-85 #423
VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. EXECUTIVE MEETINGS. WHEN PUBLIC BODY RECONVENES FOR EXECUTIVE MEETING IN DIFFERENT LOCATION, SUCH LOCATION MUST BE PROVIDED TO THOSE PROPERLY REQUESTING NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ACT.
October 17, 1984
The Honorable Madison E. Marye
Member, Senate of Virginia
84-85 423
This is in response to your request for my opinion regarding application of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, §§ 2.1-340 through 2.1-346.1 of the Code of Virginia (the "Act"), to two situations involving the Montgomery County School Board (the "Board").
You indicate that the Board is presently engaged in the process of interviewing applicants for the position of superintendent. The candidates have not been publicly identified. Your first inquiry involves a situation in which the Board convened a meeting and then went into executive session for a "personnel matter."1 You indicate that this executive session did not convene where the public meeting had been taking place but was held instead at an unannounced site. The Board members refused to divulge the location where they met to conduct an interview in executive session. Four hours later the members of the Board reconvened in the original location to adjourn the meeting. You have been informed that although notification of the location of the "continued meeting" was requested, the request was denied by the Board. You inquire whether the Board's refusal to identify the location of the executive session was in violation of the Act.
Section 2.1-343 of the Act states, in part: "Information as to the time and place of each meeting shall be furnished to any citizen of this State who requests such information." This mandate must be read in conjunction with § 2.1-340.1, which states that the Act shall be liberally construed to promote public awareness of governmental activities and that exceptions shall be narrowly construed. See City of Danville v. Laird, 223 Va. 271, 288 S.E.2d 429 (1982). Based upon the clear wording and intent of the Act as adopted by the General Assembly, I must necessarily conclude that the notice provision of § 2.1-343 applies to executive sessions (closed meetings), as well as public meetings, despite the fact that the public may be excluded from the executive session. The phrase "each meeting" applies equally to closed and open meetings despite the fact that the public may be excluded from the executive session. It is my opinion, therefore, that when a public body chooses to adjourn the public meeting and reconvene in executive session, it must provide information as to the time and location of the executive session to those citizens of the State who request such information.2
Your second inquiry involves a situation where the Board met, following the earlier meeting, over dinner, with a candidate for the position of superintendent Board members indicated that the dinner was merely a social gathering and was not an executive or public meeting. The chairman indicated that no school business was being conducted and that only school issues in general were discussed. You inquire whether the Board may meet in such a "social" setting or whether the gathering was a meeting under the Act.
Section 2.1-341 of the Act provides, in part:
"Nothing in [the Act] . . . shall be construed to make unlawful the gathering or attendance of two or more members of a body or entity at any place or function where no part of the purpose of such gathering or attendance is the discussion or transaction of any public business, and such gathering or attendance was not called or prearranged with any purpose of discussing or transacting any business of the body or entity."
The facts as stated do not show whether the dinner gathering was prearranged or if those attending merely decided to eat together following the meeting. An evidentiary issue is thus presented.
Based upon the limited information contained in your letter, I am unable to formulate an opinion whether a court would view the dinner gathering as a meeting for purposes of the Act. I note, however, that even an informal assemblage of the board members would constitute a meeting under the terms of the Act if part of the purpose of the gathering is the discussion of any public business or if the gathering was prearranged with any purpose of discussing any business of the board. See § 2.1-341(a).
In light of the intent and purpose of the Act as set forth by the General Assembly, I believe it prudent for the Board and every public entity to avoid those situations which may create the appearance of, if not the opportunity for, the private transaction of public business in situations which do not comply with the terms of the Act.
FOOTNOTES
1 The purpose for the executive session is authorized by § 2.1-344(a)(1). The identity of those being discussed in executive meeting need not be disclosed. See Nageotte v. King George County, 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982).
2 Even though such notice might tend to negate the purpose for conducting a closed session, I must leave resolution of that problem for possible legislative action.
